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Abstract—Retail electrical power marketers, also known as 
retailers, typically set up contracts with suppliers to secure 
electricity at fixed prices on the one hand and with end users to 
meet their load requirements at agreed rates on the other hand. 
Also high penetration of distributed generation (DG) resource is 
increasingly observed worldwide. Considering the viewpoint of a 
retailer, this paper analyzes the problem of setting up contracts 
on both the supplier and end-user sides to maximize profits while 
maintaining a minimum operational cost of distribution system. 
The proposed two-level optimization models can minimize the 
cost of distribution system with Distributed Generation and 
maximize the profits of retailers.  The numerical simulations are 
carried out based on an IEEE 33-bus test distribution network. 
Test results are included to show the performance of the 
proposed method. 
Index Terms—Retailer profit, electricity market, wholesale 
market, Distributed Generation (DG), social welfare, 
Distribution system, DisCo, distribution system operator (DSO). 
I.  INTRODUCTION
HE U.S. electric power market has lately undergone 
significant changes due to deregulation and restructuring 
of the industry. One result of this new marketplace is the 
emergence of third-party entities known as retailers or 
marketers. These entities purchase power from suppliers and 
sell it again to end-user customers. These retailers typically set 
up bilateral contracts with suppliers to procure a substantial 
portion of the required power to meet the demands of their 
customers. The remaining portion of the load is bought in the 
balancing energy market and is settled at the marginal clearing 
price or the spot price. Retailers set up supply contracts with 
suppliers. These contracts range from a simple fixed-price, 
fixed-quantity contract for a fixed time period—where the 
retailer takes all the risk-or to a more collaborative 
arrangement where the supplier and the retailer work on a 
profit. Retailers are also turning to other market instruments to  
Manage their portfolio and their risks. They do this by 
purchasing and selling options, hedging portions of their needs 
especially during the volatile months, and using cross-
commodity hedges (natural gas as a hedge for electricity).  
Distributed generation (DG) can be defined as the 
integrated use of small generation units directly connected to a 
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distribution system or inside the facilities of a customer [1]. 
The potential development of DG is sustained in the following 
factors: increasing power quality requirements, avoiding or 
shifting investment in transmission lines and/or transformers, 
minimizing ohmic losses, protecting  the environment, and 
maintaining high energy prices at retail level [1]–[4]. 
Traditionally, a distribution company (DisCo) purchases 
energy from the wholesale market, at a high voltage level, and 
then transfers this energy to final customers. Nevertheless, the 
restructuring process of the energy sector has stimulated the 
introduction of new agents such as retailers and products, and 
the unbundling of traditional DisCo into technical and 
commercial tasks, including the provision of ancillary services 
[2].  
While there has recently been extensive research on market 
modeling at the wholesale level, the retail side and the 
reaction with DG has received relatively less attention.  
Several researches have been carried out to find a way to 
the retail competition and reaction with distributed generation 
problems on the retail market. In Reference [5] several 
strategies have been analyzed for determining forward loads 
for electrical power retailers based on empirically fit 
probability distributions for end-user loads and spot market 
prices. In this paper it is also assumed that in a distribution 
network the retailer contracts with classes of the final 
consumers. In reference [6] there have been addressed the 
contract design problem a retailer may encounter, both at the 
supply and end-user levels. It provides a stochastic 
programming methodology that allows the retailer to make 
informed contractual decisions, particularly in respect to 
contract prices and quantities. In accordance with [6] it should 
be emphasized that an appropriate modeling of the risk 
associated with buying from the spot market is required. In 
reference [7] a model has been defined that can be applied to 
an energy service provider (which supplies electric energy for 
eligible industrial customers) in the Spanish electricity market. 
In accordance with [7] this model results in a quadratic non-
linear optimization problem, where the objective function to 
be maximized is the economic profit obtained by the supplier, 
and it calculates the optimal electricity selling prices to be 
applied to the customers. The novel market integration 
mechanism has been presented in [8] which demonstrate that 
the design of a market interface and the consideration of DG 
units as equivalent power producers behave in accordance 
with the wholesale market methodology. The main concepts 
of the proposal are presented theoretically and are illustrated. 
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In accordance with [8] the proposed scheme shows an 
adequate trade-off between technical accuracy (marginal cost 
theory and ohmic losses) and practicability (available network 
information and information management).
A Multiperiod energy acquisition model for a DisCo in the 
competitive day-ahead electricity market with two new 
resources, distributed generation and interruptible load have 
been proposed in [9]. Due to the interactions among Discos’ 
strategies, the energy purchasing scheme is modeled as a 
bilevel optimization problem in order to maximize every 
Disco’s profits. In accordance with [9] to solve the 
complementary problems formulated from the KKT 
conditions, a nonlinear complementary method has been 
employed to solve the proposed model. 
The goal of this paper is to find the sale price of retailers in 
the way that not only increases the profit of retailers but also 
develops social welfare. By social welfare we mean 
minimizing the cost of putting the distribution system into 
operation. This goal is implemented in a distributional 
network which in itself contains some distributed generation 
resources in a way that affects the mechanism of sale business. 
The costs will include the production cost of distributed 
generation units and the cost of purchasing from the wholesale 
market. To answer the above problem, an algorithm has been 
proposed which is implemented in two phases. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we describe modeling considerations and provide 
mathematical formulations for the simulation. Section III 
describes computations and analyses presented in Section II; 
Section IV describes our numerical findings and is followed 
by the conclusions section.  
II. RETAIL ELECTRIC POWER MARKET MODEL
The model which is proposed in this section, considers two 
principles. 
• The first one concerns minimizing the cost of distribution
system operation, which is a problem Disco always faces,
which means how one should use available resources to
minimize the cost of distribution system operation. In the
proposed model, it is assumed that available resources for
Disco are distributed generation and purchased energy
from retailers.
• The second principle is about maximizing the retailer’s
profit. It must be considered that the retailer’s profit be
maximized. Retailers, on one hand purchase power from
wholesale market and distributed generation resources
with spot prices considering the marginal cost of
distributed generation units respectively and on the other
hand sell power to their final consumers with their
expected sale price.
The combination of these two pre-mentioned points 
formulates an important problem in the way of achieving the 
expected results. The proposed method in this paper is based 
on a loop.    
Meanwhile the goal of this paper is to find the sale price of 
retailers in the way that not only increases the retailer’s profit 
but also develops social welfare. By social welfare we mean 
minimizing the cost of distribution system operation. This 
goal is implemented in a distribution network which in itself 
contains some distributed generation resources in a way that 
affects the mechanism of sale business. The costs will include 
the production cost of distributed generation units and the cost 
of purchasing from the wholesale market.  
So the profit of any retailers will be mentioned this way: 
payment-incomeProfit =             (1) 
In (1), income includes the input of each retailer based on 
the existing load in its class and the tariff on which the 
contract is based. As it was mentioned in section I in this 
paper it is also assumed that in a distribution network the 
retailer contract with classes of the final consumers. These 
classes are usually based on their geographical situations. 
Payment will include the payout of each retailer to the power 
supplier with whom the named retailer contracts to provide the 
load of existing consumers in its own class. The resources 
from which the retailer in the distribution network can provide 
the power are the wholesale market and distributed generation 
resources. It is obvious that if there is no DG in the 
distribution network, the retailer will provide all the required 
power from the wholesale market with spot prices. But if there 
is any distributed generation units in the distribution network, 
then we will face a critical question and that is "what amount 
of required power would a retailer provide from the wholesale 
market and what amount will be provided from distributed 
generation units?" As a matter of principle the combination of 
the retailer’s purchase from the wholesale market and the 
distributed generation units would be in a way to increase the 
gaining profit by the retailer. But would this be advantageous 
for the final consumer to answer all these questions, in the 
following an algorithm has been proposed to reach the 
maximum social welfare.   
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
As it was mentioned earlier, the presence of distributed 
generation resources in the distribution network will bring 
about some ambiguities concerning the payout of the retailer 
and the purchasing strategy carried out by them. To remove 
these ambiguities an algorithm is proposed in this paper that 
will be accomplished in two phases. At the first phase, it is 
trying to answer the question that by what strategy should a 
retailer purchase the required power with spot price from the 
wholesale market and the distributed generation units that 
would both maximize his profit and minimize the cost of 
operating the whole distribution system and therefore increase 
the social welfare of the system. In this way at the first phase 
of this proposed algorithm an optimal power flow will be 
administered from the point of view of the distribution system 
operator (DSO), in a way that the cost of power production in 
the distribution system must be minimized. By using this 
method the production portion of each distributed generation 
unit and the power injection portion from the wholesale 
market to the distribution network classes will be determined. 
The objective function of this optimal power flow will be as 
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Where n denotes the number of classes; cLoad denotes 
real power demand of class c ; WP denotes the Injection power 
from the wholesale market; cicePr denotes the price of 
electrical energy class c ; lossP denotes real power loss in 
distribution network; m  denotes the number of DG units; 
iiiiiiDGi cPbPaPC ++= 2)( denotes the cost characteristic of 
DG at node i .
The first term in the objective function (2) represents the 
costs of energy purchasing from wholesale market, and the 
second term represents the generation costs for distributed 
generation units. Constraints (3), (4) and (5) represent the load 
balance of the whole distribution network constraint. 
Generating limit are specified as upper and lower limits for the 
real power outputs of DG unit and the voltage constraint on 
every node of the distribution network respectively. 
For the beginning of implementing this algorithm at the 
first phase, we do not have any access to the price of classes; 
therefore we need to make some initial values to determine the 
price of the classes. At the first iteration it is assumed that the 
price of the classes equals the spot price of the wholesale 
market, so a primary value for the generation of distributed 
generation units and the injection power from the wholesale 
market will be achieved. 
Using these initial values, the algorithm will enter its 
second phase. At this phase, the main goal is to maximize the 
profit of retailers in a way that according to (2) the income of 
purchasing electricity to classes be maximized but on the other 
hand the costs related to purchasing electricity from the 
wholesale market with spot price and purchasing from 
scattered resources with limited prices of these production 
units be minimized. By fulfilling this part of algorithm the 
price of electricity will be measured in each class. 
The objective function in this part would be as follows: 
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Where DGicP _ denotes the Power purchased by a retailer of 
cclass  from the distributed generation unit i ( iDG );
DGiMC denotes the marginal cost of distributed generation 
unit i ; spoticePr denotes the Spot price of the wholesale 
market; WcP _ denotes the power purchased by a retailer of 
cclass from the wholesale market; NcLoad denotes the 
nominal load of cclass ; cβ  denotes the Load elasticity 
cclass ; NcicePr  denotes the nominal sale price of cclass ;
cicePr denotes the sale of cclass .
 The first term in the objective function (6) represents the 
income of energy selling of each retailer correspondent to 
their classes, the second term represents the purchasing energy 
from distributed generation units and the third term represents 
the purchasing energy from the wholesale market. Constraints 
(7) and (8) represent the end user demand function and the 
load balance of each class respectively. 
In [10, 11] one can observe one of the existing and most 
useful models of the function of price response of loads of 
network. In (7) the load function has come in linear form 
based on nominal variables. In this equation NcicePr is the 
selling price at the nominal electrical power consumed. In 
order to calculate the nominal selling price NcicePr is applied 
to the customers. Also it is assumed that (in the situation of 
nominal demand cLoad ) the retailer sells electricity at a price 
which is 10% higher than the whole cost, that is, it assigns a 
profit on income of 10%. 
In this equation it is assumed that the response of each 
consumer to the price variation, characterized by the 
elasticity β , has to be empirically assigned. The price 
elasticity of demand β measures the degree of response of the 
demand to the changes of price in the market, being defined as 
the ratio of the variation of the demand quantity of some 
commodity or service, in percent, to the variation of its 
price icePr , also in percent. It can be expressed as: 
iceice
LoadLoad
PrPrΔ
Δ
=β      (9) 
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The demand is 'elastic' if β  is higher than 1, and 'inelastic' 
if β  is lower than 1. Considering various reference studies 
performed to characterize the end user response to several 
price strategies [12-19], elasticity values ranging from -0.01 to 
-0.25 have been chosen. Corresponding to Fig.1 elasticity 
value is determined by a negative value and equals to -0.2. 
Fig.1. Demand function  
After implementing of optimization problem in phase two, 
the sale price in each class will be achieved. Then these results 
will be applied to optimal power flow in phase one as input. 
After optimal power flow in phase one, the amount of 
economical generation from distributed generation units and 
amount of injection power from the wholesale market are 
determined. Then these economical power generation and 
injection from optimal power flow in phase one are applied to 
optimization problem of phase two as inputs in order to 
calculate sell prices. Until converging, the sale price of each 
class must be iterated. By using proposed algorithm, it can be 
seen that without load elasticity, retailer’s sale price will 
increase sharply. On the other hand, load elasticity regulates 
sale prices and limits retailer’s profit. 
IV. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 
An IEEE 33-bus distribution system [20] is used to 
illustrate the proposed model and solution algorithm. The 
system includes four distributed generation unit at nodes 4, 7, 
25 and 30, three retailers; subsequently there will be three 
classes of retailing in the mentioned system. Table I shows the 
cost characteristics of varieties of DG unit technologies 
considered in this work.  In this system the number of each 
load will be determined by the number of the node attached to 
it. Table II shows the load classification based on the classes. 
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION DATA 
WITH VARIETIES TECHNOLOGY [21] 
DG Technology a b c maxP minP
Fuel cell- CHP 0.0001 0.0315 1.0749 400 0
Gas ICE-CHP 0.0001 0.0374 0.4777 400 0
Gas ICE-power only 0.0001 0.0777 0.3483 400 0
Microturbine-CHP 0.0001 0.0421 0.5553 400 0
Microturbine-power only 0.0001 0.0841 0.4603 400 0
Note: ICE: Internal Combustion Engine, CHP: Combined Heat and Power 
TABLE II
LOAD CLASSIFICATION BASED ON RETALER CLASS 
Retailer's Class Loads 
A 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 
B 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
C 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 
The assumed time interval for simulations is 24 hours a 
day. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the load variations and spot prices 
of the wholesale market during a day respectively. 
Fig. 2 Daily Load Variations 
Fig. 3 spot prices of the wholesale market during a day 
From Fig.4 to Fig.6, it can be seen that the retailer of each 
class tends to supply the demand of its class from the 
wholesale market principally. Also it can be concluded that 
the retailer’s strategy is approximately constant with applying 
different distributed generation technologies and because of 
high consumed power in each class, retailers prefer to use this 
units in off peak hours rather than peak hours. 
4
Fig. 3 purchasing strategy of retailer of class A, with Gas ICE-Power only 
technology 
Fig. 4 purchasing strategy of retailer of class B, with Gas ICE- Power only 
technology 
Fig. 5 purchasing strategy of retailer of class C, with Gas ICE- Power only 
technology 
Fig.7 shows that the retailer’s profit without using 
distributed generation resources is increased and out of 
evaluated technologies in this paper, Gas ICE-Power only and 
Fuel Cell CHP have the highest and the lowest profits for 
retailers respectively. 
Also from Fig.7, it can be found that the retailer of class A 
has higher profit because of higher demand of its class than 
the others. More loads for the retailer dose not lead to more 
profit and the retailer’s profit is affected by load forecasting. 
More loads are equal to more load forecasting error which can 
decrease the retailer’s profit significantly. 
Fig. 6 purchasing strategy of retailer of class A, with Fuel Cell-CHP 
technology 
Fig.7 total profit of each retailer with several DG technologies 
This issue has not been modeled in the proposed algorithm. 
Simulation results are come from this fact that the retailer’s 
cost is composed of two parts. The first one is the cost of 
purchasing power from the wholesale market which is actually 
the purchased power multiplied by the price of the wholesale 
market which is constant during an hour and therefore  the 
retailer’s strategy relevant to this price will not be 
complicated. The second part of the retailer’s cost is the cost 
of purchasing power from distributed generation resources 
which includes purchased power from these units multiplied 
by their marginal cost. It is worth to mention that the 
purchasing price (i.e. the marginal cost) from these units 
depends on its active generation power and is a linear curve 
with a positive slope. On the other hand, increase in power 
purchased from these units leads to higher price of these units 
therefore the cost of purchasing power from these units is 
increased. In comparison it should be mentioned that increase 
in purchasing power from the wholesale market leads to a 
lower purchasing power than the power supplied by 
distributed generation resources mostly because of constant 
prices. 
An important point from these results is the retailer’s 
income which includes the price of each class multiplied by 
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the load of its class. As illustrated in Fig. 8 the retailer’s price 
is constant during a period and dose not respond to hourly 
variations in wholesale prices and it results to uneconomical 
signal [21], So retailers look for suitable profit margin with 
lower cost and higher income.  
Fig.8. Price of each retailer with several DG technologies 
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn from this paper:  
• Retailers can experience the most profit without using
distributed generation resources but their profits  
associated with distributed generation units are
maximized with Gas ICE-Power only technology.
• In this paper, determination of optimal purchasing
strategy and the retailer’s profit maximization is
implemented with social welfare maximization.
• Without applying subsidiary budget from governments,
distributed generations can not be supported by retailers.
• In general terms, the more elastic the behavior of
customer demand, the lower the profit obtained by
retailers, as customers have an increased response
capacity to price changes. On the other hand, most of the
inelastic customers will tolerate price increases without
reducing considerable consumption, and thus generate
more revenues and higher profits.
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